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Halford Mackinder’s work is drawn upon repeatedly by those who would promote
imperialism. Mackinder argued that geography could find a new relevance after the
Age of Explorations by serving instead the cause of the New Imperialism. Mackinder’s
geography was not only a science of empire, it was also a way of promoting the cause
of Empire. In the face of the revival of Mackinder’s work allied with the promotion of
an American Empire, we can turn to those among Mackinder’s contemporaries who
challenged the use of geography to serve Empire. From the scholarship of these dissi-
dents we can sketch ways to challenge the claims that force is the most important
dimension of international relations, that the world divides naturally into mutually hos-
tile camps, and that there are some uses of force that are sanctioned by the promotion
of democracy.
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Introduction
Prince Hassan of Jordan begins a recent article about
the security dilemmas of West Asia by discussing
the work of the geographer Halford Mackinder,
affirming that ‘[t]his thinker of a century ago has
many resonances for the political power-plays of
today’ (Hassan 2009). The Russian fascist and ultra-
nationalist Aleksandr Dugin draws upon Mackinder
for his own argument that Russia and Germany
need to fight on behalf of a continental identity
rooted in pre-Enlightenment values of mystical her-
oism, but threatened now by the cosmopolitan influ-
ence of the maritime United States (Ingram 2001;
Shenfield 2001). The journalist Robert Kaplan pro-
poses that now, more than ever, geographical facts
shape foreign policy options, and goes on to refer to
Mackinder as ‘perhaps the most significant guide to
[this] revenge of geography’ (Kaplan 2009, 99). The
British historian Tristram Hunt (2009a) produced a
radio documentary for the BBC about the paradox
of the continuing importance of Mackinder’s ideas
even while his name remains virtually unknown.
Both the Times and the Guardian carried articles by
Hunt (2009b 2009c) retailing Mackinder’s currency.
Various academic theorists of international relations
promote a greater recognition of the materialist
forces of the environment and for this reason they
too wish their discipline to take up afresh the work
of Mackinder (Deudney 2006; Grygiel 2006). The
currency of Mackinder also extends to literature
where Thomas Pynchon’s (2006) recent Against the
Day features a thinly disguised Mackinder as a pair-
ing of a British geopolitician of sea-power and a Ger-
man geopolitician of land-power. Finally, Faber and
Faber have just republished in the United Kingdom
the 1942 US edition of Mackinder’s 1919 work, Dem-
ocratic ideals and reality.
Reflecting upon the legacy of Mackinder offers
an opportunity for reconsidering both the nature of
geography and the value of geographical perspec-
tives upon international relations. Mackinder’s cen-
tral claim was that geography could aid statecraft,
and for Mackinder this meant promoting imperial-
ism through education and directing it through
politics. He was prominent in both fields. Holding
academic posts at Oxford and Reading, he was also
the second Director of the London School of Eco-
nomics. In addition, he was a Member of the Brit-
ish Parliament, chair of the Imperial Shipping
Committee, and at one time British High Commis-
sioner to South Russia. The central features of the
imperialist geography, evident both in Mackinder’s
advocacy and practice, include the following: the
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belief that the environment shapes cultural identity
in ways that produce a world that is a patchwork
of mutually hostile peoples; the argument that
international relations are primarily based upon
force and to suggest otherwise is foolish idealism;
and the claim that while most often force is
deployed for aggressive territorial gain, one’s own
state, uniquely, is driven by a defensive desire to
spread freedom and democracy abroad in the face
of the selfish aggression of others. While tribalism,
force and exceptionalism are common elements of
the world-view of those who appeal to the legacy
of Mackinder, this by no means defines the limits
of a geographical perspective upon international
relations and among Mackinder’s contemporaries
there were those who insisted that: cooperation
was every bit as real as competition; identities were
polyvalent and that the hybridity of modern life
required that we recognise mutual interdependence
rather than pursue mutual hostility; all claims to
national exceptionalism were hypocritical cloaks
for national selfishness; and that the contemplation
of the webs of life that connected people to their
environment might rather engender a greater
respect for all forms of life rather than a purely
instrumental view of nature as a storehouse to be
despoiled with reckless haste. These challenges to
Mackinder’s style of geography were evident in
public and academic discourse when Mackinder
wrote, and they remain available now to those who
quail at the imperialism promoted by so many of
Mackinder’s admirers.
The paper is in four parts. First, I look at how a
scientific approach to imperialism offered a way
for geography, as a discipline, to move beyond the
perceived limitations of its associations with explo-
ration. Then, I note the paradox that to promote
the values upon which imperialism seemed to rely
required precisely a return to the geographical
practice of the period of the great explorers. This
tension between analytical and affective geography
was not resolved by Mackinder. In the third sec-
tion, I set out the contemporary alternatives to
Mackinder’s imperialist geography. Finally, I trace
these issues and contradictions through to our
present geographical practice.
Post-exploration geography and
geopolitics
While he returned to his ruling obsessions
throughout a long career, the legacy of Halford
Mackinder in geography and geopolitics is largely
shaped by two papers that he presented to even-
ing meetings of the Royal Geographical Society.
On the 31 January 1887, Mackinder spoke on
‘The scope and methods of geography’, remarking
that the teaching of geography hitherto had been
the rote learning of ‘a mere body of information’
and, while explorers had been extending the
knowledge base of geography in exciting and
thrilling ways, the geographers were ‘now near
the end of the roll of great discoveries’ (Mackinder
1887, 141). For Mackinder, geographers needed to
synthesise the empirical knowledge thus far gath-
ered in order to explicate the broad relations
between nature, society and politics. Moving
from inventory to explanation, a ‘new geography’
might aspire to be a science of environmental
history, environmental causation and spatial
arrangement.
In 1902 Mackinder gave an object lesson in the
‘new geography’ with his own Britain and the Brit-
ish seas. By his account, the environmental history
of Britain cleft highland from lowland Britain along
economic, racial and geological lines. He claimed
that the highland areas of Britain and Ireland were
what remained of an earlier Atlantic landmass of
Atlantis. Over time, the erosion of this landmass
produced to its south and east the lowland areas of
England. Ireland, Wales, Scotland and highland
Britain were the relatively isolated and ‘rooted’ dis-
tricts, the reserves of brawn and minerals (Mackin-
der 1902, 15). In contrast, the south of England was
a more ‘cosmopolitan’ society, facing Europe; with
this ‘stimulus from without’, it ‘avoided stagnation’
(Mackinder 1902, 179). Not surprisingly, perhaps,
Mackinder identified London as, for this set of
environmental reasons, the ‘brain of the Empire’
(Mackinder 1902, 312).
These cultural differences were reinforced by a
racial geography with what Mackinder, following
the contemporary anthropologist John Beddoe,
described as dark-haired Mediterranean pre-Celts
displaced to the west by the arrival of blond Teu-
tons into the south and east. Mackinder repro-
duced Beddoe’s index of nigrescence in his book,
noting the ‘mercurial’ character and ‘emotional
temperament’ of the Celts (Mackinder 1902, 192).
For Mackinder, this racial geography had been sta-
ble for a millennium. He identified a distinctive
English race with the inhabitants of ‘the English
Plain’, a group whose pure blood was the ‘fluid
essence’ of ‘John Bull’ (Mackinder 1931, 326), and
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who had a talent for responsible government. This
talent was ‘something physical, and therefore not
wholly transferable except with the blood’ (Mackin-
der 1925, 726), a blood that had moved with British
emigrants to the colonies and ex-colonies inhabited
or ruled by the larger family of Britons. Mackin-
der’s Britain and the British seas ended on, or rather
should I say ascended to, an imperial note with
Mackinder warning his readers that
[a]ll the Britains are threatened by the recent expansion
of Europe, and therefore all may be ready to share in
the support of the common fleet, as being the cheapest
method of ensuring peace and freedom to each. (Mac-
kinder 1902, 351)
Mackinder’s ‘new geography’ collated the details
of geological history and then correlated these with
the emergence of a geography of settlement based
upon racial difference. The geography of Britain,
then, was ‘the intricate product of a continuous
history, geological and human’ (Mackinder 1902,
229–30). It was a geography that had produced a
precious bloodline, needed foreign dependencies
abroad to resource it, and would require racial
hygiene at home to preserve it. The British, wrote
Mackinder, had to be taught to ‘value the Empire
as the protection of their manhood’ and he went
on to say that ‘[h]erein, half consciously, lies the
reconciliation of Colonial Liberalism with protec-
tion, the exclusion of coloured races, and imperial-
ism’ (Mackinder 1905, 143). The ‘new geography’
must, in this way, ‘depart from the impartial views
of science’ because the British people faced a crisis
of national and racial survival. Geographical educa-
tion was thus vital for
the practical citizens of an empire which has to hold its
place according to the universal law of survival through
efficiency and effort. (Mackinder 1911, 83)
This version of the scope and methods of geogra-
phy bid fair to
satisfy at once the practical requirements of the states-
man and the merchant, the theoretical requirements of
the historian and the scientist, and the intellectual
requirements of the teacher. (Mackinder 1887, 159)
The second of Mackinder’s seminal papers
addressed directly the ‘practical requirements of
the statesman’ and in doing so more or less
established the modern science of geopolitics
(O´ Tuathail 1996; Kearns 2009a). On 25 January
1904, Mackinder took up where he had left off
17 years earlier by remarking that
[o]f late it has been a commonplace to speak of geo-
graphical exploration as nearly over, and it is recog-
nized that geography must be diverted to the purpose
of intensive survey and philosophic synthesis. (Mackin-
der 1904, 421)
On this occasion, Mackinder wished to develop the
implications not for the subject of geography, but
for the foreign policy of the United Kingdom.
His argument was that with no new lands to
chart, stakeout or claim, imperial expansion would
drag and any established power would now only
gain a relative advantage over another by filching
from the other’s colonies. This, then, was a newly
interconnected world in which
[e]very explosion of social forces, instead of being dissi-
pated in a surrounding circuit of unknown space and
barbaric chaos, will be sharply re-echoed from the far
side of the globe. (Mackinder 1904, 422)
The world was suddenly more dangerous with the
end of the Age of Discovery, but by contemplating
the shape of the passing era, its ‘correlation
between the larger geographical and the larger his-
torical generalizations’, the geographer might iden-
tify
something of the real proportion of features and events
on the stage of the whole world, and may seek a for-
mula which shall express certain aspects, at any rate, of
geographical causation in universal history. (Mackinder
1904, 422)
Cultivating in this way the wisdom of hindsight,
geography might serve modern statecraft.
Mackinder believed that geography had shaped
for the British a unique combination of imperialism
and democracy. This view of British exceptionalism
had deep roots, although Mackinder refined it in
distinctive ways. In 1674, reflecting upon the strug-
gle between England and the Dutch Republic for
global supremacy, John Evelyn had concluded that:
[A] spirit of commerce, and strength at sea to protect it,
are the most certain marks of the greatness of empire,
deduced from an undeniable sorites; that whoever com-
mands the ocean, commands the trade of the world,
and whoever commands the trade of the world, com-
mands the riches of the world, and whoever is master
of that, commands the world itself. (Evelyn 1859, 41)
For Evelyn, global hegemony secured political lib-
erty. The eighteenth-century political historian,
John Millar, believed that the insularity of the Brit-
ish gave little justification for the creation of a large
standing army and thus removed the temptation
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for monarchs to suppress internal dissent with
troops raised for external protection. Not only did
the British monarch lack a large standing army but
the force it did command, a multitude of sailors,
was of little domestic use, being, Millar argued,
generally ‘at too great a distance, and their opera-
tions of too peculiar a nature, to admit of their
being employed occasionally in quelling insurrec-
tions at home’ (Millar 1818, 122). Thus,
having no sufficient military force to support their
claims, [English monarchs] were laid under the neces-
sity of making such concessions, and of permitting the
erection of such barriers against oppression, as the
awakened suspicion and jealousy of the nation thought
indispensable for securing the ancient constitution, and
restraining the future abuses of the prerogative. (Millar
1818, 124)
Echoing this traditional British eulogy to sea-power
(Deudney 2006), Mackinder invited British school-
children to reflect upon the happy insularity that
showered ‘the great blessings of peace and freedom
at home’ (Mackinder 1910, 57). He went further
than Millar, though, suggesting that sea power was
pacific not only for the home nation but also for its
overseas rivals. Sea power was no basis for territo-
rial conquest, since ‘warships cannot navigate
mountains’ and thus even when it held sway as
the indisputable continental hegemon, the British
had ‘not sought to make any permanent European
conquests’ (Mackinder 1919, 74). However, Mackin-
der was much less sanguine than contemporaries
such as Alfred Mahan about the continuing pre-
dominance of sea- over land-power. From his stud-
ies of military history, Mahan had suggested that
sea-power was ever decisive in resolving great
power rivalries. Writing of the global struggle
between Britain and Spain, 1660–1783, he had con-
cluded that:
[i]t can scarcely be denied that England’s uncontrolled
dominion of the seas, during almost the whole period
chosen for our subject, was by long odds the chief
among the military factors that determined the final
issue. (Mahan 1918, 63–4)
In turn, these battles for maritime dominance were
vital for economic development since, Mahan
reminded American isolationists, ‘beyond the
broad seas, there are the markets of the world, that
can be entered and controlled only by a vigorous
contest’ (Mahan 1897, 4).
Reviewing global relations at the cusp of the
new 20th century, Mackinder was more pessimis-
tic. The self-confidence of the British project of
Empire had met three checks, inducing anxieties of
imperial decline. In the first place, the productivity
gap of the early industrial revolution had been
closed by Germany and the United States so that
British goods were no longer the first choice in all
open markets. New industrialisers, furthermore,
were protecting their home markets to nurture
local industries, which meant that the global empo-
rium was now a less friendly place. Secondly, the
British faced challenges to their colonial rule from
nationalists in Ireland, Egypt and India. In South
Africa, the second Boer War (1899–1902) had seen
one quarter of a million British troops prevail only
with great difficulty against the Dutch-African
farmers. The war was dear in both treasure and
reputation and the savage policy of isolating the
Boers from food and rural support by concen-
trating them in camps scandalised global liberal
opinion. Finally, evidence from recruiting stations
showed that many British adult males were unfit
to fight. This resulted in a national debate about a
perceived deterioration of the physical capacity of
the British urban working class and the creation by
the government of an Inter-Departmental Commit-
tee on Physical Degeneration (Searle 1971).
Mackinder expressed in geopolitical terms the
anxiety that the British people were no longer
ready or able to meet the global challenge of inter-
national competition (Semmel 1958; O´ Tuathail
1992; Heffernan 2000). He argued that there was a
crisis for Britain, produced by a shift in the way
the environment directed human history. Mahan
and Evelyn had indeed once been right, but they
were now out of date. In the life of the world
organism, suggested Mackinder, the relations
between technology and strategy were about to
change producing a new post-Columbian age.
Reviewing the period before 1492, Mackinder iden-
tified constant pressure upon the Western Powers
from the East, and he believed that in Europe’s
‘secular struggle against Asiatic invasion’, Asia had
operated rather like a ‘repellent personality per-
form[ing] a valuable social function in uniting’ and
indeed stimulating European civilisation (Mackin-
der 1904, 423).
The steppes of Russia had been a pathway along
which nomadic tribes from Mongolia in the east
came periodically westwards to hammer against
Christendom, thereby annealing European culture
by martial test. The Europeans had withstood
the test and indeed had been driven to establish
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extensive empires overseas as, with Columbus,
they turned their attention to the seas and away
from their land border with the Asian steppes. But
now those steppes were wheatfields, and now rail-
ways snaked across them and into the new Russian
territories of Siberia bringing wheat, coal and oil
together into a gigantic common market. This
could now be the basis for a new land-power, and
one that enjoyed a significant immunity to chal-
lenge from the sea for, noted Mackinder, this
region of ‘Euro-Asia is characterized by a very
remarkable distribution of river drainage’, with riv-
ers that ‘have been practically useless for purposes
of human communication with the outer world’ for
they drain either to internal lakes or into the
seasonally frozen waters of the Arctic Ocean
(Mackinder 1904, 430). Euro-Asia was now deve-
loping, defensible and threatening.
The iron horse had transformed the space rela-
tions of the world organism. At precisely the
moment when Britain had sent an army overseas to
South Africa to sustain its desperate struggle against
the Boers, Russia had sent an army to Manchuria in
its own war against Japan. For Mackinder this
underlined the new realities providing ‘as significant
evidence of mobile land-power as the British army
in South Africa was of sea-power’ (Mackinder 1904,
434). After ‘nearly 200 years of intense competition
between the empires of Russia and Britain’, Mackin-
der’s emphasis upon Euro-Asia was to some extent a
return to a familiar battleground, although with
renewed urgency and pessimism (O’Hara and Hef-
fernan 2006, 55).
Euro-Asia, then, was the ‘geographical pivot of
history’, the region through which Asiatic pre-
ssure had stimulated European invention driving
the western Europeans onto the seas, and now the
foyer of a new land-power with the resources, the
invulnerability and the inbred proclivity to chal-
lenge for global domination. The British would
need the resources of its empire and an alliance
with the United States if it were to keep the newly
mobile land-power away from the sea. These, then,
were the geographic realities and Mackinder’s
wished to awaken among the British a sense of the
desperate threat since the coming struggle would
depend upon ‘the relative number, virility, equip-
ment, and organization of the competing peoples’
(Mackinder 1904, 437). The British needed to pre-
pare for war, to train soldiers, build battleships
and educate their young for imperial and racial
responsibilities. ‘The British tradition’, he wrote for
schoolchildren, was ‘worth fighting for [ . . . , for] no
other national tradition has equally conduced to
the development of what is happiest and highest in
mankind’ (Mackinder 1915, 288).
For Mackinder, the end of exploration posed a
crisis for geography and required a ‘new geogra-
phy’ of geographical explanation rather than the
continued accumulation of mere geographic
description, but it also brought on a crisis for the
British Empire. With no new lands to conquer, con-
flict between powerful states was inevitable. This
struggle for survival in a finite world meant that
the British Empire would face the strategic possibil-
ity of mobile, aggressive land-power displacing
mobile, pacific sea-power. In this way a scientific
geography could serve as an aid to statecraft by
identifying the major foreign policy dilemma facing
the British and by training children to become
fierce imperial citizens. Yet, this educational role
required that geography both inspire as well as
instruct, and this made evident a contradiction
between the analytical and the affective uses of
geography.
Masculinity, science and Empire
As geopolitics, a new scientific geography met the
needs both of scholarship and of the British
Empire. Yet the links between scientific geography
and geopolitics were as much affective as deduc-
tive, and these affective relations destabilised the
neat trajectory from ‘scope and methods’ in 1887 to
‘geographical pivot’ in 1904. Indeed, with hind-
sight, Mackinder picked not 1887 nor 1904 as ‘in
some ways the culminating year of my life’, but
rather he identified 1899 as including his most sig-
nificant achievement, ‘my Kenya year’ (Mackinder
nd). Thirteen years after announcing the end of
exploration and the consequent need for a ‘new
geography’, Mackinder was back at the Royal Geo-
graphical Society on the evening of 23 January 1900
and on this occasion, as on no other in his career,
his entry to the lecture hall of the Society was
greeted with prolonged cheering. He was lionised
as the conqueror of Mount Kenya, the first Euro-
pean to ascend the second highest peak in East
Africa, snatching a prize in a region where German
alpinists had bagged most of the other trophies
(Barbour 1991).
Mackinder spoke of this as exploration, noting
that ‘it was still necessary at that time for me
to prove that I could explore as well as teach’
Geography, geopolitics and Empire 191
Trans Inst Br Geogr NS 35 187–203 2010
ISSN 0020-2754  2010 The Author.
Journal compilation  Royal Geographical Society (with The Institute of British Geographers) 2010
(Mackinder nd) and also that ‘there was the ambi-
tion no longer to count as a mere armchair geogra-
pher’ (Mackinder 1991, 31). Masculinity was a
crucial and disturbing element in the relations
between science and geography at this time. On
one hand, in the debates over the admission of
women as Fellows in the 1890s, some male Fellows
saw the exclusion of women as crucial to the status
of the Society, with one Fellow insisting that the
question resolved itself into a simple choice: ‘[i]s
the Society to be a scientific or a pleasure society?’
(Times 30 May 1893, 9e). Science was more serious
than entertainment and as such was manly, yet it
was also contemplative and thus, paradoxically,
less manly than active life. In 1924, Joseph Conrad
averred that ‘[o]f all sciences, geography finds its
origin in action, and what is more in adventurous
action’, but the academic turn drained all excite-
ment from the subject leaving only the ‘bloodless’
certainties of ‘bored professors’ (Conrad 1926, 3).
Clements Markham, the president of the Royal
Geographical Society when Mackinder went to
climb Mount Kenya, and who announced Mackin-
der’s triumph to an evening meeting of the Society
praising it as a ‘model exploring journey’ (Times 14
November 1899, 3e), himself addressed the Society
on the field of geography in 1898, placing expedi-
tions at its heart for their bravery:
Of this splendid courage, which knows no turning back
from duty, no fear, no thought of self, our best discov-
erers and explorers are made. It is with such stuff that
the greatness of our country has been built up; as well
as by that moral courage which prompts men, in posi-
tions of responsibility, to decide upon the right course,
which is usually the boldest course. (Markham 1898, 6)
Fidelity to duty at risk of life and limb was cele-
brated as patriotic virtue. Certainly Mackinder had
risked his life in climbing Mount Kenya but, in
pursuing his prize, he had been reckless also with
the lives and heedless of the comforts of others.
He impressed, or rather hired as slaves, some
170 African porters and he barely fed them. He
had difficulty in raising food locally. The building
of the Uganda railway was continuing and
required that 16 000 labourers be provisioned from
the villages through which Mackinder marched.
The whole area had been disrupted by a smallpox
epidemic with consequent loss of farming work.
Finally, the year before Mackinder arrived, the Brit-
ish had gone with a force of 5000 into the region,
torching villages and spilling the blood of a
hundred Kikuyu people for the murder of the
unannounced traveller, Captain Alfred Haslam.
Mackinder pronounced it ‘rather comic!’ that one
local administrator had tried to recall his expedi-
tion for the order had arrived only once Mackinder
was on his way back down the mountain (Mackin-
der 1991, 246).
Only days earlier the situation had seemed dire
and Mackinder had worried that even the Europe-
ans would run out of food; the Africans had
already been starving for much of the trip anyway.
At least one porter died of dysentery and several
more appeared even to Mackinder as ‘mere famine
stricken skeletons’ (Mackinder 1991, 158). Yet, these
men had to be driven, for Swahilis had, according
to Mackinder, ‘no morals’ (Mackinder 1991, 56)
and were at best ‘faithful dogs’ since ‘slave blood
still runs in their veins’ (Mackinder 1991, 200). Nor
were matters even vaguely amusing when Mackin-
der shot off rounds from his gun to underline for
his porters the ‘moral suasion of my Mauser’ (Mac-
kinder 1991, 160). Mackinder even kidnapped a
local chief as hostage against the provision of food
for his expedition. His colleague Campbell Haus-
burg ‘lashed at the men vigorously’ (Mackinder
1899a, 298) to prevent them from feeding on the
sugar cane in fields through which they walked.
Still, as men collapsed from fatigue, Mackinder
ordered beatings for those that discarded any part
of their load, and, while Mackinder was sure that
the Swahili among his porters ‘did not cling to life’
(Mackinder 1991, 241), it was finally hardly ‘rather
comic!’ when eight recalcitrant porters were ‘shot
by orders’ (Mackinder 1899b).
The scientific achievements of the expedition
were modest and, although Mackinder made care-
ful notes of location and altitude, his singular aim
was to get to the top and back down again before
anyone else, and the transect was proof of his suc-
cess. Primacy was everything. He said that he kept
his plans secret because ‘I had no wish to find
myself competitor in a race up a virgin peak’
(Mackinder 1945, 231). When he got there he
recorded in his diary, ‘[h]urrah. Kenya is no longer
a virgin peak’ (Mackinder 1899b, 65), and he imme-
diately diminished the mountain, chipping off the
top and bringing it back to his desk at Oxford as a
trophy.
Mackinder not only expressed his conquest in
sexual terms, he also shared Markham’s view of an
expedition as both a microcosm of society and a
test of patriotism and moral fibre. When his porters
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begged for a halt to one day’s march, his reason
for refusing was based purely on his belief that
‘[i]n the interests of discipline I determined that
my will must prevail’ (Mackinder 1991, 111). The
expedition was society writ small. Like the expedi-
tion, society at large rested upon force rather than
upon a consensual social contract. Using his gun to
frighten his porters into taking up again their loads
gave him the ‘strange experience’ of being ‘brought
face to face with the ultimate sanctions of society’
(Mackinder 1981, 160), and when he once decided
not to retaliate against a village that had killed two
porters he had sent foraging for food, he described
the self-restraint as ‘much against natural impulse’
(Mackinder 1991, 182).
Mackinder understood force, and hence mascu-
linity, as the primary basis of the social contract.
Mackinder opposed women having the vote, argu-
ing that extending the franchise to a weaker sex
obscured the fundamental relation between force
and decisionmaking, and he told the House of
Commons that he was only ‘willing to obey the
majority if that majority has all the physical force
necessary to coerce me – if it is a considerable
majority, if it is a virile majority’ (Hansard 19 Feb-
ruary 1912, 368). In that sense, he believed a vote
to be ‘a cheque or draft on power, and ultimately,
on physical power’ (Hansard 5 May 1911, 763) and
that government by majority was ultimately only a
representation of the balance of force in society,
‘[t]he sanction [ . . . ] of party government is that
there must be the possibility of civil war’ (Hansard
5 May 1911, 761). Since the vote of a woman did
not represent an equal threat of force, Mackinder
considered it a counterfeit.
For Mackinder, international relations were also
defined by ‘the whole conception of permanent
struggle’, a struggle, moreover, which his own
country could neither evade nor afford to lose
(Mackinder 1905, 141). Mackinder gloated that the
reality was that ‘the principle of nationalities has
carried the day’, rendering idealistic and irrelevant
those who ‘dream of a general philanthropy which
is slowly to efface all frontiers’ (Mackinder 1905,
141). Mackinder thus insisted that diplomacy rested
upon calculations about ‘the relative strength and
preparedness of the contending nations’ (Mackin-
der 1915, 197). For example, North Germans were
described by Mackinder as a ‘virile race’ (Mackin-
der 1919, 110), whereas, for him, Indians were ‘an
effeminate race’ (Mackinder 1981, 55). International
relations was a kind of mathematical balancing of
nations, each expressed as the product of its popu-
lation, military, virility and strategy. In proposing a
toast to the ‘Armed Forces’ at a public dinner, Mac-
kinder praised them as the ‘force [ . . . ] behind our
diplomacy’ but, and with equal significance, as
necessary at home ‘to maintain order in the pres-
ence of industrial strife’ (Glasgow Herald 12 October
1911).
In his Civics textbook, Mackinder (1922) subtitled
the chapter on the army, simply ‘international rela-
tions’. It was because he believed force to be soci-
ety’s one foundation and the basis of international
relations that Mackinder insisted that the ‘great
organizer is the great realist’ (Mackinder 1919, 18)
and that the British, in their idealistic belief in
legality and democracy, had ‘neglected materialistic
geography’ (Mackinder 1919, 28).
With its title of Democratic ideals and reality
(1919), Mackinder’s most famous book stated
plainly that if the world after the Great War of
1914–18 were to be remade as a purely legal order,
then statesmen would be ignoring the material
realities of force, of unbalanced economic growth
between nations. A policy based on geographical
realism would instead caution continual prepared-
ness for war as the best way to deter attack. The
lesson of the last war had been that, blinded by
democratic hopes and moral ideals, ‘Western
democracies were unprepared’ (Mackinder 1919,
31) for the struggle. Thus Mackinder urged his
own strategy in opposition to the ‘ethics of the
democrat’ for the democrat had ‘refused to reckon
with the realities of geography and economics’
(Mackinder 1919, 33).
At first blush, the relations between geography
and geopolitics, between ‘scope and methods’ on
one hand, and ‘the geographical pivot’ on the
other, might appear to be between science and its
application. In the context of the end of an age of
exploration, a geographical education, according to
Mackinder, was not only to prepare students for
their imperial responsibilities simply through
instruction, but pupils had also to recognise the
heroism of force. As he wrote for Indian pupils:
‘[t]here is a splendid side to war. There are occa-
sionally magnificent scenes in it. There is always
room for skill and courage’ (Mackinder 1909, 98).
In 1942, at one of the darkest periods of the Second
World War, Mackinder wrote to the secretary of
the Royal Geographical Society hoping that ‘all
goes well with you in these tremendous days’
(Mackinder 1942).
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Mackinder recognised that his instruction to
schoolchildren frequently expressed more than ‘the
impartial views of science’ (Mackinder 1911, 83).
One of his textbooks closed with this peroration to
emigration within the Empire:
Those who can find work to-day in Britain should stay
among friends, but those who have no work should
cross the ocean and make new homes for themselves in
Canada, or Australia, or New Zealand, or South Africa.
In all these lands they will remain the subjects of our
King Edward VII; the same flag will be theirs and they
will not be among foreigners. (Mackinder 1906, 298)
Clearly, geography was a training in values as well
as in material realities. Certain attitudes were
taught by imperialism and others were necessary
for its perpetuation. Their maritime adventures
made the British the bravest people on earth, for
Mackinder believed that
[t]he rocks and the tempest demand courage and
endurance more persistently than the wild beasts and
sand storms of the wilderness. So the man who goes
down to the seas becomes in the end master of the
world. (Mackinder 1913, 102)
Mackinder argued also that the Empire taught a
global perspective and gave many British people
direct experience of ruling others, encouraging
among them and their relatives a governing frame
of mind:
The effects of Empire are not, however, wholly eco-
nomic; for good or for bad they are also moral. Most
British families, whether rich or poor, have relatives in
the colonies, and a widened outlook is the consequence.
But in addition to colonists, properly so-called, and to
mercantile agents within the tropics, there are in Asia
and Africa at least ten thousand officers, civil and mili-
tary, drawn largely from the middle classes, yet accus-
tomed to the rule of subject races and to the thoughts of
statesmen. (Mackinder 1902, 348)
Retaining the Empire required a martial attitude
and here Mackinder’s geography continued to be
shaped by the values celebrated by Clements
Markham as the heritage of exploration. Like
Markham, Mackinder saw dangerous expeditions
as both training for and example of the fortitude
needed by an imperial people. It is striking that
the duty that justified Mackinder’s violent behav-
iour in Kenya was the patriotic desire to best an
imperial rival, Germany, and that the same appe-
tite for national pre-eminence informed his geo-
politics. Prevailing in science seemed to require
the same discipline, force and command over
others that were needed to prevail in international
relations. In a world shaped inevitably by force,
insisting that it was the patriotic duty of the Brit-
ish to retain global hegemony required that the
British believed their own use of force did more
than merely reflect the behaviour of their rivals.
Mackinder argued that when the British used
force they did so defensively and in order to bless
the world with democracy. Mackinder’s masculin-
ity, then, excused the use of force in expeditions
in the name of science, and in international rela-
tions in the name of democracy.
Mackinder retreated from his earlier repudiation
of exploration not only because he needed the sup-
port of the expeditionary lobby to get a renewal of
support from the Royal Geographical Society for
the School of Geography at the University of
Oxford (Kearns 2009a), but also because geography
had to be more than science if it was to inculcate
values. The traditions and practices of exploration
and expedition celebrated competition between
nations, the importance of physical bravery and the
idea that success attends those who pursue their
interests with forceful determination. Physical trial
and force were part of an international competition
in which scientific excellence was more alibi than
goal. Identifying force as the basis of social
contracts encouraged a majoritarian understanding
of democracy and a martial view of international
relations.
Challenging Mackinder
Certainly Mackinder was a creature of his time,
an era when social Darwinism dominated social
and political thought, yet the central terms of
these relations between geography and geopolitics,
between science and masculinity, between force
and law, were contentious. Mackinder may have
been comfortable taking geography outside the
bounds of pure science in the service of Empire,
but others at the Royal Geographical Society were
less so. When, at the very time Mackinder was
presenting his paper on ‘Scope and methods’, the
Prince of Wales approached the Council of the
Royal Geographical Society for assistance in estab-
lishing a new Imperial Institute to promote enthu-
siasm for and emigration to the colonies, the
Council refused to circulate its members about the
initiative with its President, Lord Aberdare,
declaring that these imperial aims bore no close
relation to the central purpose of the Society,
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which was ‘the promotion of geographical know-
ledge and scientific exploration’ (Royal Geographi-
cal Society 1887, 2–3).
The Society tried to remain above politics,
re-establishing scientific relations with German
academics with what some saw as indecent haste
after the First World War and welcoming with
regularity and enthusiasm republican anarchists
and honouring them for their scientific achieve-
ments (Kearns 2004). And while George Curzon
was prominent in the successful campaign to sus-
pend the admission of women Fellows after the
experiment began in 1892, and, while he protested
that he would ‘contest in toto the general capabil-
ity of women to contribute to scientific geographi-
cal knowledge’ (Times 31 May 1893, 11d), when
he was President in 1912 he advocated success-
fully the admission of women on the basis of their
‘valuable and serious’ ‘additions to geographical
knowledge’ (Anderson 2006, 91). Others were
more immediate in their rejection of the sugges-
tion that geographical science could be served
only by men. Not only did many other geographi-
cal societies precede the Royal in their admission
of women (Bell and McEwan 1996), but both the
President, Monstuart Grant Duff, and the Secre-
tary, Douglas Freshfield, resigned over the
rescinding of the 1892 decision to admit women
(Bell and McEwan 1996; Goldie 1906). Freshfield
challenged the presumption that most Fellows
conformed to the heroic image of a robust man
braving danger to return with the golden fleece of
fresh discoveries. As he observed, only ‘a compar-
atively small proportion of our Fellows can be
makers of knowledge; most of us are content to
be receivers and transmitters only’ (Times 6 June
1893, 6e). Such humility was not universal but it
is significant that it was available within the high-
est reaches of the Society.
Nor did everyone accept that explorers had a
right to be unmindful of the lives of indigenous
peoples as they raced each other to chart rivers or
scale peaks and some contemporaries were very
critical of the violence of such explorers as Henry
Stanley (Driver 1991). Mary Kingsley learned, as
Mackinder did not, enough of the local pidgin Eng-
lish to converse with her porters. She considered
threatening porters with a pistol ‘utter idiocy’,
thinking there ‘something cowardly in it’ (Kingsley
1897, 330). She boasted that she had ‘never raised
hand nor caused hand to be raised against a native’
(Kingsley 1897, 503).
Empathy rather than coercion was at the heart of
her expeditionary practice and she at least attrib-
uted this in part to her being a woman and perhaps
thus not given so easily to male arrogance (Blunt
1994, 105–7). Thus she spoke of being able to feel
secure in Africa by relying upon ‘the ideas in men’s
and women’s minds; and those ideas, which I think
I may say you will always find, give you safety’
(Kingsley 1897, 329). She claimed that her
capacity to think in black came from my not regarding
the native form of mind as ‘low’ or ‘inferior’ or ‘child-
like,’ or anything like that, but as a form of mind of dif-
ferent sort to white men’s – yet a very good form of
mind too, in its way. (Pearce 1990, 145)
George Bernard Shaw praised Kingsley for ‘her
common sense and goodwill’, comparing her
favourably with ‘the wild beast-man, with his ele-
phant rifle, and his atmosphere of dread and mur-
der, making his way by mad selfish assassination
out of the difficulties created by his own cowar-
dice’ (Pearce 1990, 92).
Just as with Markham and Mackinder, Kingsley
offers a model of expeditionary practice that is not
only an epistemology, a description of the way to
acquire knowledge, but is also in miniature an
exemplar of international relations. For Kingsley,
empathy is not only a way to survive, it is a way
to learn, by reducing rather than extending one’s
cultural distance from the people among whom
one moved and upon whom one depended. There
are evident limits to this humanism, but it did
allow Kingsley to make the effort to understand
local belief systems as structures of feeling suited
to the livelihoods and experiences of those who
affirmed them. She did not think there was much
value in Europeans trying to convert Africans to
their own presumably superior ways of thinking,
concluding that ‘[t]he great difficulty is of course
how to get people to understand each other’
(Kingsley 1901, xvi). For Kingsley, respect and
understanding justified caution and restraint in for-
eign relations, a striking contrast to Mackinder’s
presumption of cultural superiority that informed
his references to barbarians, such as when he wrote
in one textbook of the contrast evident in passing
from Europe to Africa:
[a]t Gibraltar you are in a civilized and Christian coun-
try, under the British flag, with civilized and Christian
Spain close at hand. At Tangier we are in a barbaric
country, the people of which are Mohammedans. (Mac-
kinder 1912, 103)
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Social Darwinism was dominant at the Royal Geo-
graphical Society and Mackinder was no exception.
For Mackinder:
[T]he most important facts of contemporary political
geography are the extent of the red patches of British
dominion upon the map of the world, and the position
of hostile customs frontiers. They are the cartographical
expression of the eternal struggle for existence as it
stands at the opening of the twentieth century. (Mackin-
der 1902, 343)
Mackinder repeatedly claimed a biological founda-
tion for his view that the reality of international
relations, inconvenient to liberal idealists, was piti-
less competition, for ‘Nature is ruthless, and we
must build a Power able to contend on equal terms
with other Powers, or step into the rank of States
which exist on sufferance’ (Mackinder 1905, 143).
One RGS President, Francis Galton, wrote similarly
of those marginalised by the Malthusian struggle
for survival as ‘a population for whom there is no
place at the great table of nature’ (Galton 1869,
356). The formulation of another Fellow of the
RGS, Thomas Huxley, was widely accepted when
he tweaked liberals that ‘[f]rom the point of view
of the moralist the animal world is on about the
same level as a gladiator’s show’ (Huxley nd, 330).
In this famous article on ‘The struggle for existence
in human society’, Huxley warned that if society
tried to mitigate the natural cull of the weak, it
was ‘setting limits to the struggle’, ensuring that it
might not be the fittest who would go on to breed
the next generation (Huxley nd, 331).
But, here again, Mackinder’s view had its critics.
Kropo´tkin detested Huxley’s ‘atrocious article’
(Kropo´tkin 1962, 299) while one friend from the
Royal Geographical Society, the explorer of the
Amazon, Henry Walter Bates, agreed, writing to
Kropo´tkin that it was ‘a shame to think of what
they have made of Darwin’ (Kropo´tkin 1962, 300).
Douglas Freshfield likewise sustained Kropo´tkin in
his attacks upon Huxley, sending information
which Kropo´tkin promised to use in an ‘article on
the numberless forms which mutual aid takes in
our own times even though the structure of Society
appears to be entirely individualistic’ (Kropo´tkin
1892).
Kropo´tkin’s work on mutual aid was a root and
branch attack on the style of social Darwinism evi-
dent in Mackinder’s writings. Kropo´tkin insisted
that cooperation was a constant feature of human
society and that upon this rested the higher forms
of civilised life. Everything noble was more than
individualistic. Language, law, technology, all were
equally inconceivable without interaction and inter-
dependence between individuals. In a decentralised
social order more of this interdependence would
take the form of interpersonal contact in ways that
would foster a sense of empowerment among
people.
Kropo´tkin’s world of autonomous communities
had reached its apogee in the federations of free
cities found in the most advanced European
regions of the Late Middle Ages (Kropo´tkin 1969).
Large centralised states were a threat to these com-
munes for the state leviathan concentrated power,
raising the costs of defence, diverting resources to
make tools of war, and draining initiative and
autonomy from face-to-face communities. War
might come, but it did not arise from the clash of
national interests but rather from the ways it can
serve the needs of the moneyed classes. At a time
of heightened international tension, Kropo´tkin
wrote that:
[I]f war has not burst forth, it is especially due to influ-
ential financiers who find it advantageous that States
should become more and more indebted. But the day
on which Money will find its interest in fomenting war,
human flocks will be driven against other human flocks,
and will butcher one another to settle the affairs of the
world’s master financiers. (Kropo´tkin 1897, 12)
The challenge to Mackinder is clear: competition is
not the inevitable sum of social life. Cooperation
and federation are adaptive strategies that aid the
higher development of civilisations, and the cen-
tralisation of power in states serves a class interest
and not a general interest.
Mackinder explained society in terms of environ-
ment and spatial relations, but to do so he had to
ignore what in 1918 Beatrice Webb described as
another type of momentum – the uprising of the man-
ual workers within each modern state [ . . . ] an uncom-
fortable shadow falling across his admirable maps of
the rise and fall of empires. (Webb 1952, 158)
It is not only that Mackinder was hostile to social-
ism, which he was. He referred to the Labour vot-
ers who ejected him from parliament as
indoctrinated by ‘Proletarian Sunday Schools’ so
that ‘Marxian catchwords have, for them, taken the
place of Biblical texts. Only experience of life will
win them to saner views; no argument will pene-
trate their ingrained doctrines’ (Times 23 November
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1922, 15a). He wrote of Lenin as a ‘poison which
fermented’ (Mackinder 1924, 138) and of Russia as
a country that ‘has for the present ceased to be part
of the civilized world’ (Mackinder 1924, 226).
Beyond this hostility to socialism, Mackinder also
saw locality as an alternative, and less dangerous,
basis of identity than class. Social hierarchies and
rule by experts were alike endangered by class-
based voting and Mackinder was explicit in address-
ing his fellow elected representatives in the House
of Commons, telling them that ‘[f]or my part I do
not worship King Demos’ (Hansard 19 February
1921, 369). Spatial abstractions, such as region or
province, were easier to imagine as balancing one
another, if they were not also understood to be inter-
nally divided by class in ways that might produce
cross-regional alliances. Mackinder’s spatial vision
attached people to localities and treated geographi-
cally defined nations as racialised communities of
fate. In this respect, there can only be loyalty or
treason as the national interest is asserted to be
primary and singular. Spatial thinking of this sort
makes it easy to imagine nation-states as homo-
geneous and to imagine international relations as
about the adjustment of territory rather than about
the redistribution of wealth and resources.
Another contemporary of Mackinder, John Hob-
son, also wrote about territorial competition but he
related it to economic relations rather than to mere
biology. He argued that an unproductive use of
economic surplus occurred when it was used in
ways that did not promote life and livelihoods, as
with arms spending or luxuries, such as alcohol,
that harmed vitality. He began with class relations,
arguing that too much economic surplus was used
in unproductive ways because it was ‘largely taken
by private owners of some factor of production
who are in a position to extort from society a
payment which evokes no increase of productive
efficacy, but is sheer waste’ (Hobson 1914, 178).
The monopoly power of financiers and industrial-
ists kept wages down, argued Hobson, and this
meant that there was insufficient demand to sell all
goods produced thereby driving the search for
foreign markets and foreign outlets for further
investment. To get access to foreign labour, foreign
resources, and foreign markets, these capitalists
drew their home countries into wars abroad: ‘[t]his
intervention of Governments for the supposed
advantage of their citizens has had the unfortunate
effect of presenting nations in the wholly false
position of rival business firms’ (Hobson 1914, 273).
In this way, ‘weaker nations’ become viewed ‘as
legitimate prey of stronger ones’ and it is accepted
that ‘the sole moral duty of a statesman is to pro-
mote the strength and well-being of his own state,
disregarding utterly the interests and so-called
‘‘rights of others’’‘ (Hobson 1974, 255).
He criticised the spatial language that he saw as
obfuscating the real relations of imperialism:
Paramount power, effective autonomy, emissary of civi-
lisation, rectification of frontier, and a whole sliding
scale of terms from ‘hinterland’ and ‘sphere of influ-
ence’ to ‘effective occupation’ and ‘annexation’ will
serve as ready illustrations of a phraseology derived for
purposes of concealment and encroachment. The Impe-
rialist who sees modern history through these masks
never grasps the ‘brute’ facts, but always sees them at
several removes, refracted, interpreted, and glozed by
convenient renderings. (Hobson 1988, 21)
A spatial view of the world order risks treating
nation-states as having a single and uncontestable
interest in foreign wars. Hobson was angered by
the presentation of the imperial contest as ‘inevita-
ble’, which he saw as a way of allowing politicians
to evade questions of ‘human responsibility’ and
instead hide behind ‘a view of history which sees
it composed of great tidal movements of economic
or racial forces making for a partition of the earth’
along racial lines (Hobson 1901, 82). Hobson
returns our attention to the class interests that pro-
mote certain policies as the national interest and to
the global human rights that should restrain inter-
ventions abroad.
For Mackinder there were two sets of relations
between geography and geopolitics. In the first
place, geographical analysis of races, empires and
nations suggested the viability and necessity of cer-
tain geopolitical strategies. However, we have also
seen that these relations between geography and
geopolitics were more than merely scientific and that
geography served also to inculcate among British
youth the values that would lead them to take up
the geopolitical challenge that Mackinder insisted
was unavoidable. If Hobson questioned the scientific
basis of the relations between geography and geo-
politics, it was left to the greatest geographer of the
age, E´lise´e Reclus, to refute the proposition that
geography should be a training for Empire. Like his
friend Kropo´tkin, Reclus did not see humanity as in
competition with nature but rather he wrote that
[h]umanity’s development is most intimately connected
with the nature that surrounds it. A secret harmony
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exists between the earth and the peoples whom it nour-
ishes, and when reckless societies allow themselves to
meddle with that which creates the beauty of their
domain, they always end up regretting it. (Reclus 2004,
125–6)
Geography should nourish a love for the beauty of
nature so that children would grow up respecting
all forms of life and cultivating their own lives in
resonance with the pulse of nature for he was sure
that civilised people were ‘the conscience of the
earth’ (Reclus 1864, 763).
In the second place, Reclus stressed human
interdependence. He understood human civilisa-
tion as a shared achievement, insisting that ‘[t]here
is no longer any possibility of progress, other than
for the world as a whole’ (Reclus 1905, 37) given
that the idea of separate human societies was now
chimerical, there being no ‘longer to be found com-
pletely homogeneous races, except perhaps in the
Andaman Islands and Yesso’ (Reclus 1884, 19). The
apparent differences in wealth and technology
between various peoples, most notably between
those of Europe and Asia, were attributed by
Reclus to the consequences of colonialism and were
in any case historically recent and probably not
long for this world. Hobson insisted that wealth,
properly understood, was ‘the power to sustain
life’ (Long 1996, 18). By this test, capitalist colonial-
ism was impoverishing and Reclus noted with dis-
gust that famines in India were accompanied by
price speculation and rice export. Reclus, as Be´at-
rice Giblin’s notes, believed that ‘[f]amines and
shortages cannot be systematically explained as
natural disasters, but result also from the develop-
ment of a market economy’ (Giblin 2005, 140). Food
security was a matter of justice rather than charity
and in an interdependent world, ‘[t]he conquest of
bread’, he suggested, ‘does not consist only in eat-
ing, but in eating bread that is one’s human right’
(Reclus 1908, 528). The lessons of geography
should advance the cause of human solidarity and
in his final magnificent synthetic work, L’Homme
et la Terre, Reclus wrote that ‘[i]n its essence, human
progress consists in common cause being found
among all peoples’ (Reclus 1908, 531). This is very
different from geography in the service of Empire.
Echoes of Mackinder
The issues with which Mackinder and contempo-
raries wrestled are still with us and geography
remains entwined with geopolitics and Empire,
both in practice and in theory. In closing, I want
to highlight three powerful echoes of the debates
from a century ago. First, I want to note that for
some people geography should still serve as aid
to practices of statecraft that are distinctly imperi-
alist (that is, they compromise the sovereignty of
foreign peoples; Kearns 2009a). In this new phase
of imperialism the tools of GIS have been of par-
ticular value. Second, for some people geography
should still serve to inculcate manliness, and this
is still thought to serve patriotism in ways that
Markham and Mackinder would recognise at
once. Third, for some people these martial atti-
tudes remain vital to national survival and these
theorists continue to draw inspiration from
Mackinder’s geopolitics in their insistence upon
force as the essential basis of the relations
between states. The field of geography remains
saturated with issues arising from the practices of
imperialism and engaging with Mackinder and his
critics is more than a historical exercise, it is an
urgent political responsibility.
GIS and the new imperialism
Geography remains a science with complicated
relations with imperialism, as revealed by some
recent adventures in GIS. Geoffrey Demarest spent
23 years in the US military, mainly in Latin Amer-
ica, including serving as the military attache´ at the
US Embassy in Guatemala from 1988 to 1991, and
he is now an academic at the Foreign Military
Studies Office at Fort Leavenworth, Kansas,
whence he has published a series of papers and
books about the relations between economic devel-
opment, military security, property rights and the
mapping of those rights. In Geoproperty (Demarest
1998), his argument is that only private property
conduces to civilisation and that beyond clear
parcels of private (and, perhaps, well-defined com-
munal) property there is nothing more than power-
making-right, a world of terror and lawlessness.
However, for Demarest, there is a further benefit of
a clear property regime and that is that it allows
efficient surveillance of insurgents for ‘geographic
behaviour is often revealed by public documents,
especially property documents’ and ‘[a]ny environ-
ment where public documents reveal relationships
between people and places is going to present a
less survivable battlefield to the insurgent leader’
(Demarest 2009, 73).
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Surveillance is evident also in Batson’s research
at the US National Defense Intelligence College,
concerned with Registering the human terrain: a valu-
ation of cadastre, that is with ‘tying a ‘‘person,’’ an
individual, a group, or a non-natural person such
as an organization, to a geographical place through
property records’ (Batson 2008, xiii). The geogra-
pher Jerome Dobson proposed a project for creat-
ing a geographic information system for all parts of
the world that would provide information at ‘a
pittance compared to what the intelligence commu-
nity typically pays for far less effective information’
(Dobson 2006, 2). The project was adopted by the
American Geographical Society, which honoured it
with the title of the Bowman Expeditions, and the
initial research in Mexico was sponsored by the
Foreign Military Studies Office at Fort Leaven-
worth, which appointed Geoffrey Demarest as its
liaison to the project.
Having visited Mexico to plot rural land owner-
ship, the team has provided a GIS that may prove
useful to the Mexican government in its plans to
privatise communal rural land, and to the US mili-
tary in its pursuit of those Mexicans it identifies as
insurgents. Other geographers have protested this
alliance of GIS with military intelligence and in
April 2009 the Indigenous Peoples Specialty Group
of the Association of American Geographers asked
the executive committee of the AAG to look into
the claims that the indigenous peoples who were
being mapped had protested as soon as they
learned of the involvement of the FMSO and had
asked that the Bowman Expeditions’ Me´xico Indı´-
gena project both desist and return all data once
(Indigenous Peoples Specialty Group 2009). This
controversy concerns the right of indigenous peo-
ple to refuse to be the objects of military intelli-
gence (Mychalejko and Ryan 2009) and to resist the
privatisation of their communal resources, too often
simply the first step towards ‘accumulation by dis-
possession’ (Harvey 2003, 45).
Geography and the crisis of masculinity
Some geographers still worry about the relations
between science and manliness. Recently, the Royal
Geographical Society has been divided again
between academics and explorers in debating
whether it should once more fund large-scale expe-
ditions to remote places, and this time too the issue
has been presented in terms of the masculinity of
hardy travel, and once again the claim has been
made that this is a necessary route to valid knowl-
edge (see Maddrell 2010). Simon Reid-Henry (2009)
argued that the age of expeditions was really, actu-
ally, finally over and that the fellows of the Royal
Geographical Society should accept the fact and
accept also the modernisation of the practice of
geographical science. In contrast, the journalist
A.A. Gill reported with approval that a recent spe-
cial meeting of the Society to debate a motion in
favour of large expeditions was opened by one
gentleman who surveyed the meeting room of the
Society, remarking with evident pleasure that they
had gathered to discuss the matter in a room
bedecked with ‘the names of the great explorers.
Above us, the pediment glows golden with the sur-
names of Scott and Livingstone, of Shackleton and
Burton, and a hundred other glittering supermen
of extremity’, and Gill himself went on to praise
‘discovery’ as ‘tumescently inspirational’ (Gill
2009). Another Fellow of the Society was quoted as
regretting that ‘if you see someone posing by the
South Pole with a husky, it is more likely to be a
television celebrity than someone advancing the
sum of human understanding’ (Catling 2009).
On this occasion, the ‘supermen of extremity’
lost the vote (Royal Geographical Society 2009)
leaving one of their supporters to claim that they
will be back, for ‘these explorers are made of stern
stuff – if you’ve lost fingers to frostbite and toes to
Amazon stingrays, you are more than capable of
fighting for what you believe in’ (Thomson 2009).
This appeal to straight masculinity is also evident
when the journalist Charles Moore recoils at the
thought
that the society has become more a trade union for
academic geographers and less a body doing its own
intellectual and practical work. It has set up a Space,
Sexualities and Queer Working Group to promote inter-
est in ‘geographies {that unnecessary plural is always a
bad sign} on issues related to sexualities {ditto} and
queer studies’. (Moore 2009; interpolations by Moore)
Geopolitics and the necessity of Empire
These practical entanglements of geography with
Empire are matched by a renewed theoretical
attention to geography and geopolitics. In Great
powers and geopolitical change, Jakub Grygiel
bemoans the ‘premature death of geography’, sug-
gesting that the study of international relations is
dominated by social-scientific perspectives on
power and ignores the natural-scientific insights
‘characteristic of the early studies of geopolitics’,
notably those by the ‘most well known geopolitical
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writer, Sir Halford Mackinder’ (Grygiel 2006, 6).
Grygiel follows Mackinder in stressing the impor-
tance of competition over resources and the domi-
nation of trade routes and suggests that in this way
it might be possible to ‘maintain the American pre-
ponderance of power in the world’ (Grygiel 2006,
xii), recalling directly Mackinder’s earlier desire to
preserve British global hegemony. In a study of
Darwin and international relations, Bradley Thayer
makes a related argument that social-scientific
explanations of international relations are incom-
plete without the supplement of evolutionary biol-
ogy. He argues that war is an evolutionary
adaptation in that it is an effective way to gain and
retain resources, and that, furthermore, ethnic iden-
tity and xenophobia are also adaptations, allowing
for the effective mobilisation of bellicose instincts.
Thayer likewise looks back to Mackinder as one of
the few theorists who showed ‘sensitivity’ (Thayer
2003, 148) to the strategic importance of resource
competition in global conflict. In similar fashion to
Mackinder, then, Thayer offers a biological account
of international relations as an anarchic mutual cal-
culation of relative power.
There is a broadly based turn to geography in
international relations but, as Simon Dalby (2009)
notes, it is to an environmentalist geography that
allows theorists both to ignore modern geographi-
cal scholarship with its emphasis upon social and
political factors, while also using older geographi-
cal arguments to attack the social-scientific
approaches of modern political science. Robert
Kaplan’s recent article on ‘The revenge of geogra-
phy’ exemplifies this return to geography, and to
Mackinder in particular, for Kaplan suggests that
‘perhaps the most significant guide to the revenge
of geography is the father of modern geopolitics
himself – Sir Halford J. Mackinder’ (Kaplan 2009,
99). Kaplan’s argument echoes Mackinder in at
least three ways. In the first place, he offers an
environmentalist explanation of inter-state conflict.
Kaplan sees identities as essentially tribal and
determined by geography. Unlike ethnic groups
and tribes, states are not natural. expressing an
‘inflexible, artificial reality’ (Kaplan 2000, 39)
which, in many parts of the world, is fast disap-
pearing under the pressure of resource conflicts
that result from humanity ‘challenging nature far
beyond its limits’ so that ‘nature is now taking its
revenge’ (Kaplan 2000, 18). Malthusian resource
conflicts are, suggests Kaplan, producing the break-
down of states, the resurgence of primordial tribal
identities, the merging of crime and war and a des-
perately dangerous world that scorns liberal ideal-
ism.
The second element in Kaplan’s geopolitics,
then, is an emphasis upon force. As with Mackin-
der, this is offered as a dose of realism against the
delusions of idealists. For Kaplan, realism ‘means
focusing upon what divides humanity rather than
on what unites it’, upon ‘the bleaker tides of pas-
sion that lie just beneath the veneer of civilization’
(Kaplan 2009, 98). Population growth will exacer-
bate resource conflict, reducing much of the world
to mere anarchy and, suggests Kaplan,
[a]s long as there is no Leviathan to hold sway over the
countries of the world, power struggles will continue to
define international politics and a global civil society
will remain out of reach. (Kaplan 2002, 107)
Kaplan can see only one solution to global anarchy
and that is American hegemony, and this national
exceptionalism is the third feature that Kaplan
shares with Mackinder. Kaplan notes that with its
‘enormous technological advantages’, the United
States will be ‘the military superpower for decades
hence’ and that as such ‘[t]he world in the foresee-
able future will depend more on the preferences of
Americans than on any other single factor’ (Kaplan
1998, xv). His analysis of the causes of imperialism
stresses the paradoxical pursuit of domestic peace
through foreign intervention: ‘the demand for abso-
lute, undefiled security at home leads one to con-
quer the world’ (Kaplan 2005, 5). The United States
cannot avoid trying to project its power across the
whole world, both because ‘[t]here is no credible
force on the horizon with both our power and our
values’ (Kaplan 2002, 147) and because ‘whether a
global system reflects the values of the Western
democracies or does not, makes all the difference
in the world’ (Kaplan 2002, 145).
Given this advocacy of imperialism, it is not sur-
prising that Kaplan should turn to Mackinder for
an analysis of geopolitics (Kearns 2009b). Stressing
the environmental control on history makes the use
of force not so much a policy choice as a necessity,
and presents the imperialism of a democratic power
as the best of possible worlds for almost everyone.
As we engage with these new geographical argu-
ments for imperialism, these ‘architects of empire’
(Morrissey in press), we can draw upon the critique
of environmentalism that geographers subsequent
to Mackinder have developed (Blaut 2000; Harvey
1996), but we might also return to the arguments of
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those of Mackinder’s contemporaries who despite
sharing with him the apogee of the British Empire
were yet able to see how force both required and
reinforced a lack of empathy with distant strangers,
how the claims of democratic exceptionalism were
all too easily deployed in pursuit of sectional eco-
nomic interests that undercut the autonomy and liv-
ing standards of weaker folks abroad, how
arguments from biological necessity took a very
one-sided view of the social forces that promoted
well-being and comfort, and how the development
gap was produced and widened under specific his-
torical circumstances that would neither last nor
testify to any inherent cultural superiority. In ques-
tioning the place of force in geographical practice
and theory, these alternatives to Mackinder offer a
legacy that remains worthy of attention. The world
is not only to be apprehended through force.
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